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Abstract
Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) exemplifies IoT with applications in manufacturing, surveillance, automotive, smart
buildings, homes and transport. It leverages sensor technology, cutting edge communication and data analytics technolo-
gies and the open Internet to consolidate IT and operational technology (OT) aiming to achieve cost and performance
benefits. However, the underlying resource constraints and ad-hoc nature of such systems have significant implications
especially in achieving effective intrusion detection. Consequently, contemporary solutions requiring a stable infrastruc-
ture and extensive computational resources are inadequate to fulfill these characteristics of an IIoT system. In this paper,
we propose an intrusion detection framework for the energy-constrained IoT devices which form the foundation of an
IIoT ecosystem. In view of the ad-hoc nature of such systems as well as emerging complex threats such as botnets, we
assess the feasibility of collaboration between the host (IoT devices) and the edge devices for effective intrusion detection
whilst minimizing energy consumption and communication overhead. We implemented the proposed framework with
Contiki operating system and conducted rigorous evaluation to identify potential performance trade-offs. The evaluation
results demonstrate that the proposed framework can minimize energy and communication overheads whilst achieving
an effective collaborative intrusion detection for IIoT systems.
Keywords: Internet of Things (IoT), Industrial IoT, Intrusion Detection, Constrained IoT Devices, Performance
Evaluation
1. Introduction
Internet of Things (IoT) is a network of connected de-
vices that are equipped with specialized software, actua-
tors, sensors, electronic, and communication systems. IoT
devices are capable of monitoring physical environment,
reporting events and information from the physical world
to a remote system for meaningful decisions. IoT has re-
ceived significant attention over the recent years and has
been a building block for number of emerging domains
such as smart cities, smart industries and smart homes.
It is estimated that the number of IoT devices across the
world will exceed more than 26 billion by the year 2020
[15, 4, 2]. A predominant area of IoT applications is in-
dustrial settings, Industrial IoT (IIoT), such as manufac-
turing, surveillance, automotive, smart buildings, homes
and transport as illustrated by [47] and [45]. A study
by Forbes [1] has estimated manufacturing, transportation
and logistics industries to spend more than $40 billion by
2020 to adopt IoTs for improved services and functions.
The extraordinary growth predicted by such studies is pro-
foundly due to widespread use of embedded controllers in
such industries to achieve automation. The significance
of IoT within industrial applications is further heightened
due to forthcoming adoption of 5G technologies which will
strengthen the impact of IoT by virtue of seamless inte-
gration with back-end services such as cloud computing
[23].
Typically, devices in an IoT network are autonomous
and connected to each other as well as physical systems
such as grids, automobiles and industrial systems converg-
ing into Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) [24]. This creates
an open architecture for the IoT making them an attrac-
tive target for malicious actors intending to break the se-
cure network infrastructure, or compromise sensitive infor-
mation about behaviour of the users as well as attempt-
ing to undermine critical national and international infras-
tructures. These factors intensify the significance of secu-
rity and privacy mechanisms for IoT systems and therefore
mandate explicit efforts to address them.
A typical IoT device has limited processing power, en-
ergy resources, and communication range. In view of these
characteristics and the need for connectivity, 6LoWPAN
standard (IPv6 over Low power Wireless Personal Area
Networks) [20], [31],[33] has been developed to enable such
resource-constrained devices to communicate with each
over the existing IPv6 network. This standard facilitates
communication between devices by performing header com-
pression and fragmentations to fit the large sized IPv6
packets into smaller link layer frames such as those defined
in IEEE 802.15.4 [30]. For a typical LoWPAN, this con-
nectivity is achieved by using an edge router which facili-
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tates connectivity among the devices participating within
a LoWPAN as well as with the Internet. However, an IoT
network is vulnerable to security threats because of its
openness, larger foot print, continuously changing topol-
ogy, real-time joining and leaving of nodes in the network
and lack of centralized network management systems. Fur-
thermore, IoT devices have unique features such as limited
power supply, limited energy and communication band-
width, small memory size and data storage. These con-
straints have significant impact on the effectiveness of se-
curity solutions for IoT infrastructures both in terms of
scalability [25] as well as performance efficiency of the so-
lution [23]. Hence designing an effective intrusion detec-
tion system for the IoT network is non-trivial motivating
us to investigate challenges to achieve an effective intru-
sion detection system for IoT without incurring significant
computation and communication overheads.
An Intrusion detection system (IDS) can be distin-
guished in two fundamental system architectures [46, 28,
49]: standalone, and collaborative systems. A standalone
system uses information from a single source, whereas a
collaborative system uses information from diverse set of
devices across network. Furthermore, an IDS can be either
placed at the device level (host-level) or the edge router
level (network base). Within this context, standalone sys-
tems are not ideal for resource-constrained devices because
of high energy and memory overheads. Additionally, a
standalone system can be easily circumvented by sophisti-
cated attackers rendering their monitoring ineffective. The
objective of our research is to investigate challenges within
intrusion detection for resource-constrained IoT devices
with two-fold motivation: firstly, IoT devices are typically
resource constrained thereby limiting their ability to host
sophisticated security system and secondly, ad-hoc nature
of 6LoWPAN network allows devices to connect to other
devices at runtime typically for short time periods there-
fore creating a volatile infrastructure. We believe transfer-
ring computation workload from device level to edge router
will not only benefit the resource-constrained devices but
also have the advantages of collaborative defense against
malicious actors. We believe that due to the adhoc na-
ture of such systems, a collaborative intrusion detection
approach will enable the edge routers to use collective in-
formation from various devices to have rigorous view of
the characteristics of events visible to them.
In this paper we propose a framework for COLlabora-
tive Intrusion DEtection for IoT (COLIDE) which lever-
ages the fundamental principle of collaboration between
individual sensor nodes and the edge router to achieve ef-
ficient and cost-effective intrusion detection for IoT sys-
tems. The framework is composed of a device level and
a edge router component. The device-level component is
responsible for detection at the device level, monitoring
events visible at the device level whereas the edge router
module is responsible for processing security events from
the IoT devices for the meaningful decision (malicious or
non-malicious), which is then communicated back to the
IoT device to block or allow events of specific patterns.
By adopting this approach, COLIDE is able to enhance
defence for a LoWPAN by using security events gathered
at all the participating node therefore protecting against
complex, multi-stage attacks. We also believe correlating
the events from multiple devices can facilitate minimizing
the false positive rate, improve the detection rate under
distributed attacks and also minimize the workload for the
end host. We have implemented the framework in the Con-
tiki operating system simulating real-lfie scenarios such as
Denial of Service (DoS) and Botnet attacks. The evalua-
tion results demonstrate that COLIDE is effective against
such threats whilst minimizing communication, processing
and memory overheads.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section
2 describes the related work regarding intrusion detection
in an IoT network. Section 3 presents our proposed intru-
sion detection approach for IoT including its description
and formal analysis using Z-notations. A detailed descrip-
tion of the experimentation setup is presented in section 4
with thorough evaluation presented in section 5. Section
6 presents an overall discussion about the effectiveness of
the scheme highlighting its applicability and effectiveness
for IoT systems. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2. Related work
Intrusion detection within IoT systems has received
significant attention in recent years. Reviewing the lit-
erature, we identified significant overlap with existing IDS
efforts for wireless sensor networks as well as SCADA sys-
tem however we only include efforts focusing specifically
on IoT systems here. Furthermore, we have organized the
selected efforts into categories based on the approach used
for intrusion detection i.e. signature, anomaly or hybrid.
2.1. Signature based intrusion detection
Sheikhan and Bostani [41] presented an effort simi-
lar to [35] such that; both focus on using network traffic
of the devices for intrusion detection purposes, consider
the resource-constrained 6LowPAN devices based system,
and finally, both approaches are focused on the sinkhole
and selective-forwarding attacks. However, the COLIDE
framework proposed in this paper is capable of working
with diverse devices and a range of issues including dif-
ferent types of attacks, inherent flexibility of the IoT net-
works, and the lack of trust among the participating de-
vices. Forzin et al. [40] proposed leveraging Snort, a
contemporary signature based network IDS, to establish
a portable, easy to use and versatile intrusion detection
system for IoT networks. The resultant IDS is packaged
within a Raspberry Pi so it can be transported with the
device to any network the hardware travels to. Conse-
quently, the device is not dependent on a centralized IDS
which is an advantage of a host based intrusion detection
system.
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Kasinathan et al. [21] presented an IDS framework for
6LoWPAN able to detect denial of service attacks by mon-
itoring physical parameters of the device. The proposed
IDS is included into an IoT network and monitors network
traffic for both signatures and abnormal behaviour to iden-
tify malicious users. The intrusion detection component is
implemented using an open source IDS Suricata which has
complete IPv6 support, multithreading, automatic proto-
col detection and a built-in intrusion prevention system.
Sedjelmaci et al. proposed an efficient and lightweight
intrusion detection mechanism for securing the vehicular
network in [39]. The approach utilizes the rule-based in-
trusion detection to identify different type of attacks. In
[6], Alessandro et al. proposed an IDS architecture for
the IoT that uses the Raspberry Pi equipped with Snort
intrusion detection system. The authors in [19] proposed
intrusion detection system for the visual sensor networks
based on traffic pattern matching and then a hierarchical
self-organizing map (HSOM) is employed to learn traffic
patterns and detect intrusions.
2.2. Anomaly based intrusion detection
In [11], Chordia and Gupta proposed an anomaly based
IDS focused on four attacks namely; U2R, R2R, DoS and
Probe. The proposed system aims to monitor network
traffic and uses techniques such as K-NN, K-Means and
Decision Table Majority Rule Based scheme. Khan and
Herrmann [22] proposed an IDS for IoT by using trust
management mechanism which collects information about
neighboring devices and their reputation. Authors investi-
gated the patterns of normal use for the RPL protocol us-
ing them as a foundation to devise trust among a sensor de-
vice and the edge routers. The proposed approach is aimed
at routing-specific attacks such as sinkhole, selective for-
warding and version number. [42] presents an IDS where
each device monitors nearby devices for abnormal activity.
If an abnormality is detected, packets for malicious node
are blocked and reported to the parent node or root node
by Distress Propagation Object (DPO). Zhang et al. [48]
proposed a hierarchical and distributed IDS (SGDIDS) for
smart grids which is applied to three layer communication
network i.e. Home Area Network (HAN), Neighbourhood
Area Network (NAN) and Wide Area Network (WAN) and
is envisioned to address the cyber-physical nature of smart
grids protecting against both physical and cyber attacks.
It leverages classification algorithms such as support vec-
tor machine (SVM) and artificial immune system (AIS)
in order to determine occurrence of an attack, the attack
type, and its origin. Similarly, Saeed et al. [38] used ran-
dom neural networks to achieve intrusion detection for IoT
systems.
Due to the emergence of recent IoT Botnet threats such
as Mirai [17], recent approaches have focused on protection
against such attacks. In this context, [27] present one of
the first efforts focusing on protection against the IoT bot-
nets which are one of the emerging threats for IoT systems.
The authors use deep learning autoencoders to establish an
anomaly detection engine which is evaluated against two
major botnets i.e. Mirai and BASHLITE. With respect
to placement of the IDS, authors use a hybrid approach
where by a central unit coordinates with device level en-
coders (each encoder is responsible for profiling individual
IoT device). Similarly, [26] use deep learning to achieve
effective detection of IoT botnets. Furthermore, both ap-
proaches are similar in that they use patterns within net-
work traffic to discover anomalous behavior representing
infection caused by botnets. In terms of placement of the
intrusion detection system, the authors have adopted a
network based approach employing deep packet inspection
techniques.
2.3. Hybrid intrusion detection approaches
Raza et al. [35] proposed a hybrid intrusion detection
system for IoT taking into account unique network ele-
ments of IoT i.e. network protocols developed for the con-
strained devices including RPL and 6LowPAN. Further-
more, Nobakht et al. [32] proposed a host based IDS using
Software Defined Networks (SDN) for smart homes. The
authors define three requirements for an efficient IDS for
IoT i.e. unobtrusive approach, negligible overheads, and
scalability and aim to achieve these with their proposed
approach. Obaid et al. [37] presented one of the early ef-
forts to develop an intrusion detection system for IP-based
wireless sensor networks. The authors presented RIDES
which is a hybrid IDS combining both anomaly and mis-
use based intrusion detection approaches. Although our
approach has similarities with [37] in that it also uses both
signature and anomaly based detection systems, however
[37] proposed to use both detection engines at device and
edge router level. We believe this has significant perfor-
mance overheads especially at device level due to limited
resources. On the contrary, we propose using signature
based intrusion detection system at the device level and
the anomaly based IDS at the edge router thereby signif-
icantly reducing the overall performance overhead. In [5],
Abduvaliyev et al. presented another hybrid intrusion de-
tection system which combines anomaly and misuse based
intrusion detection aimed at protecting the cluster heads
which the authors believe is the first target for any attack
on WSN.
2.4. Other intrusion detection approaches
In [50], Zhou et al. proposed a decentralized multi-
dimensional alert correlation system for the collaborative
intrusion detection. The system consists of two algorithms
implemented in a distributed CIDS, first algorithm clus-
ters alerts locally at each device, before reporting signifi-
cant alert patterns to a global correlation stage. The au-
thors in [29] proposed a self-adapting, knowledge-driven
IDS for IoT network running different communication pro-
tocols. Golomb et al. [16] present an innovative approach,
CIOTA, to intrusion detection for IoT leveraging blockchain
technology. The proposed approach is comprised of local
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agents and a central component which coordinates infor-
mation (alerts) received from these agents. Authors use
blockchain technology to achieve assurances about the au-
thenticity of alerts generated by local agents.
In summary, COLIDE makes contribution to the ex-
isting knowledge within intrusion detection for IoT net-
works with respect to working with diverse devices and a
range of issues including different types of attacks, lim-
ited device-level resources and the inherent flexibility of
the IoT networks.
3. Intrusion detection framework for Constrained
IoT Devices
We have proposed a novel intrusion detection system -
named COLIDE, for constrained IoT devices as introduced
in [7]. COLIDE is a collaborative IDS for IoT infrastruc-
tures which takes into account resource constraints, flexi-
bility and diversity of devices and emphasizes cooperative
nature of such systems. A graphical representation of the
COLIDE framework is presented in Fig 1 presenting its
different components and interactions between them.
As presented in Fig 1, intrusion detection is performed
at two levels, the IoT device level and the edge router
level. A detailed description of these components along
with motivation for the framework and formal representa-
tions is presented in the following sub-sections. In order
to to aid the formal notations for different components of
the systems, we define the following data models:
EH: a set of events for the host H
SE: state of an event; it can be malicious or non-malicious
SEH: state of an event for host H;
PH: Detection policy for host H
HOSTS: a set of hosts within a LoWPAN
MEH:a set of events identified as malicious by device-level
components for a host H
PRE-COND: a set of events classified as a pre-condition
for a complex attack
POST-COND: a set of events classified as a post-condition




























Figure 1 An overview of collaborative intrusion detection system
for IoT
3.1. Device level detection
The device level detection module is envisaged to be
a light-weight module present at all endpoints (IoT de-
vices). This module is envisioned to take advantage of the
unique visibility offered by a device level system to im-
prove the overall intrusion detection. In this regard, we
propose using signature based intrusion detection within
devices due to its efficiency with respect to consumption of
computational resources as compared with anomaly based
detection. Furthermore, the choice of implementation for
network vs host based monitoring at device level is ren-
dered application specific as it will influence the types of
attack that the system can mitigate with. For instance,
a Denial of Service (DoS) attack targeted to flood specific
devices within a LoWPAN can be detected by monitoring
network traffic whereas a backdoor channel attack targeted
at gaining unauthorized access to a device can be detected
by monitoring system events. The detection engine for
the device level module therefore processes the informa-
tion generated by the monitor(s) using existing signatures
to detect attack attempts.
To present device level component in formal notations,
let us define an event within a given host H as Ehi . In
view of the flexibility of implementation (network or sys-
tem) offered by this component, this event can represent a
system event such as a system call or a network event such
as a network packet. In both scenarios, Ehi will be com-
posed of a number of parameters which will be important
to decide if an event is malicious or non-malicious. For in-
stance, for a network packet, these parameters can include
protocol, inter-arrival time and packet size. Therefore, Ehi
can be represented as:
Ehi : {pr1, pr2, pr3, · · · prn}
where prn is a parameter for an event. Within the con-
text of the above scenario, the Detection Engine DE is
expected to categorize Ehi as malicious or non-malicious.
The intrusion detection policy Ph is contributes towards
this decision. Therefore, if SEhi represents the state of an
event Ehi , the following can be represented as the intrusion
detection function.
SEhi : DE (Ehi ,Ph)
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if Ehi ∈ EH then
SEHi = DE (Ehi ,PHi)
if SEHi = Malicious then
IntrusionResponse(Ehi ,SEHi)
3.2. Edge router detection
An edge router is an important component within IoT
systems as it enables connectivity between the LoWPAN(s)
and the Internet. We envisage leveraging enhanced com-
putational capabilities of edge routers to achieve rigorous
intrusion detection for IoT systems as highlighted in [18].
In particular, the edge router detection module is envis-
aged to monitor traffic for LoWPAN(s) connected to it
thereby achieving an extra layer of protection for the in-
frastructure. Among other benefits, it enables detection of
attacks affecting multiple devices within a LoWPAN due
to the level of visibility offered by the edge router.
Within the proposed system, the edge router detection
module also called the Global Detection Enactor (GDE),
has three components: Alert Collector (AC), Correlation
Agent (CA), and Detection Agent (DA). As the edge router
is envisaged to monitor all the devices within a LoWPAN,
it requires a mechanism to communicate with individual
IoT devices and be able to identify threats/alerts respec-
tively. In the proposed system, this function is achieved
within the GDE by the Alert Collector which communi-
cates with individual IoT devices to gather alerts from
the device-level monitoring agents. This can be achieved
through an established lightweight protocol such as the
Message Queuing Telemetry Transport (MQTT) protocol.
However, A typical intrusion is usually not an isolated ma-
licious event which can be achieved within a single trans-
action or network event but is usually a series of steps
each of which may target a specific vulnerability aiming
to achieve overall successful intrusion. In this regard, the
proposed system implements the Correlation Agent com-
ponent which facilitates countermeasures for such attacks
by correlating malicious events at network and system lev-
els as monitored by the device level monitors. Correlation
of security events is a well researched area with recent ap-
proaches focusing on use of association rule mining and
deep learning techniques to achieve this effectively. This
enables improved visibility into the events within IoT de-
vices and facilitates detection of complex attacks which
involve multiple different steps thereby improving the ef-
fectiveness of the intrusion detection process.
As a snapshot of formal representation of the GDE, we
include the formal notation for the Correlation Agent be-
low with details of other components provided in [8]. This
formal notation is envisaged to help development of the
GDE for specific IoT environments and ensures correctness
of the scheme against design flaws. As presented in the for-
mal description, the correlation agent takes a set of events
which have been identified as malicious (M EVENTS ) by
device level agents (line1). It also defines the set of all
events and identifies dependencies between them (line 2-4)
which will indicate a potential correlation between them.
Finally, the CA iterates through the malicious events set to
identify temporal relationship between individual events.
If a temporal relationship between two events is identi-
fied, the CA then triggers intrusion response system with
the chain of events so to evaluate appropriate response
required for the intrusion.
[Global Detection Enactor]
∆Correlation Agent
MEHi?,MEHj ? : MEVENTS
EHi? : EVENTS
dependencies − evaluation :




IF (MEHi .post − cond = MEHj .pre − cond)
∧ (ti < tj ) THEN
Intrusion Response(MEHi ,MEHj )
Furthermore, anomaly based intrusion detection ap-
proaches have historically demonstrated better efficiency
especially with respect to detection of complex, multistage,
and zero day attacks however at the cost of increased re-
source consumption. Due to the increased capability of
edge router devices, we propose implementing anomaly
based intrusion detection at the edge router. The Detec-
tion Engine at the edge router is envisioned to achieve this
through the alerts collected and correlated by the Alert
Collection and Alert Correlation components.
3.3. Formal analysis of the scheme
A key characteristic of the proposed scheme is its abil-
ity to protect against multi-stage attacks. In this section
we evaluate correctness of the scheme to evaluate depen-
dencies among malicious events and detection accuracy for
multi-stage attacks.
a. Analyzing correctness of dependencies evaluation:
Let PRE −COND = pre1, pre2, ..., pren represent a set
of possible pre conditions for respective malicious events.
Let POST − COND = post1, post2, ..., postn represent
a set of possible post conditions for respective malicious
events.
∃1 Ehi ,Ehj | (posti 6= prej∧MEdi .post = MEdj .pre)∀(posti =




∀Ehi ∈ MEVENTS , dependencyevaluation : (Ehi , pre, post)→
DEPEND • pre ∈ PRE −COND • post ∈ POST −COND
∧PRE − COND 6=<>
∧POST − COND 6=<>
⇒ dependencies ′ = dependencies ∪ Ehi ⇔ pre = post
∧(te > tcp) ↔ ¬(∃Ehi ,Ehj , | (posti , 6= prej ∧MEdi .post =
MEdj .pre)V (posti = prej ∧MEdi .post 6= MEdj .pre) • j >
i • Ehi ∈ MEVENTS •MEdi ∈ DEPEND
⇔ false
The above proof verifies the ability of the proposed
intrusion detection scheme to correctly identify and match
dependencies between individual attack steps.
b. Correctness to detect multi-stage attacks:
The property of the scheme to mitigate against multi-
stage attacks can be formally represented as under.
((∃1 Ehi | DE (Ehi))∧(¬ΣDE (Ehi)))•Ehi ∈ MEVENTS
In order to prove this, we can divide this into two parts.
For the first part,
⇔ (∃1 Ehi—(Ehi)) • Ehi ∈ MEVENTS
From specification,
∀Ehi | Ehi ∈ MEVENTS•(MEHi .postcond = MEHj .precond)
∧ (ti < tj ) | (SHEi = Malicious ∧ SHEi=Malicious)
⇔ DE (Ehi) ∧ SHEi= Malicious
⇔ DE (EHi) | Ehi ∈ MEVENTS ∧ Ehi ∈ DEPEND ∧
SHEi=Malicious
⇔ DE (EHi) | Ehi ∈ MEVENTS ∧ Ehi ∈ DEPEND ∧
DE (Ehi) | Ehi ∈ DEPEND
⇔ DE (EHi) | Ehi ∈ MEVENTS ∧ Ehi ∈ DEPEND ∧
DE (Ehi)
∈ DEPEND • dependencies ′ = dependencies ∪ (Ehi)
⇔ (Ehi .postcond = Ehj .precond) ∧ j > i
⇔ ¬(∃1 Ehi | (Ehi))
⇔ false
The above analysis proves that the hypothesis⇔ ¬(∃1 Ehi |
DE (Ehi)) • Ehi ∈ MEVENTS i.e. the intrusion detection
performed at the edge router level takes into account mul-
tiple events and the dependencies among them.
Now the second part can be written as under.
(¬ΣDE (Ehi)) • Ehi ∈ MEVENTS
From specification,
∀Ehi | Ehi ∈ MEVENTS • (MEHi .postcond
= MEHj .precond)∧(ti < tj ) | (SHEi = Malicious∧SHEi =
Malicious)
⇔ DE (Ehi) • Ehi ∈ MEVENTS ⇔ DE (Ehi) +
DE (dependencies → Indivdamage)
⇔ DE (Ehi) + DE (dependencies → Indivdamage)
∧ : νFDEPEND •DEPEND 6=<>
⇔ DE (Ehi) + ΣMEdi ,DE (Medi) •
Medi ∈ dependencies •DEPEND neq <>
⇔ DE (Ehi) • Ehi ∈ MEVENTS
⇔ false
The analysis presented above highlights the ability of
the proposed scheme to correctly evaluate dependencies
among different events to be a part of a complex attack
attempt. This is proved as both conditions necessary for
the hypothesis to be true have been found false in accor-
dance with the formal specification of the intrusion de-
tection scheme. However, as has been highlighted by this
analysis, the correct operation of the scheme depends on
the accuracy of the events data and the process of identi-
fying dependencies between individual events. The com-
pleteness, coverage and accuracy of security events is a
well-established challenge with implications across wide
application domains. Within the context of research pre-
sented here, dedicated measures can be adopted at the
event capturing (at the device level component), event
transmission (between the device and edge router compo-
nents) and event correlation (at the alert correaltor) stages
with each of these phases introducing specific challenges.
For instance, the alert correlator component is envisaged
to produce a directed acylic graph by utilizing techniques
such as association rule mining to identify relationships be-
tween different events whilst taking into account temporal
relations between events. This will not only identify rela-
tionships between different events but also the sequence of
events so as to present an accurate picture of cause and
effect which will be beneficial in classifying events as ma-
licious or non-malicious.
4. Implementation and Experimentation
The implementation for the COLIDE framework was
achieved in Contiki OS, the operating system for IoT used
widely in research and industry [13]. The evaluation was
performed using Contiki v2.7 and its built-in emulator
Cooja [34]. A preliminary evaluation of the proposed scheme
was presented in [7] focusing on the overheads at the device
level. This section presents further experimentation and
evaluation of the scheme taking into account the role of
edge router and focusing at performance metrics to address
the overall performance impact of the proposed scheme.
4.1. Experimental setup
In continuation to our efforts presented in [7], experi-
mentation is focused at achieving a thorough evaluation of
our proposed approach with respect to performance over-
head caused as a consequence of achieving effective intru-
sion detection. In this respect, experimentation has sim-
ulated scenarios where multiple IoT devices from within
an IoT network are targeted as part of a large-scale attack
such as a Denial of Service or a Botnet. Such attacks are
an important threat to IoT system as identified by [DCMS]
with Miari [17], Reaper [44] and Brickerbot [43] as recent
examples of such attacks on IoT systems. One of the key
characteristics of the proposed scheme is the collaboration
between intrusion detection components at the device and
edge router levels. Therefore, the experimentation simu-
lates scenarios involving collaboration between the device-
level and edge-router IDS components to achieve effective
intrusion detection. Within this context, each device-level
IDS agent implements signature based approach to mon-
itor traffic using predefined intrusion signatures. Upon
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detecting an intrusion attempt, each device-level compo-
nent is programmed to transmit intrusion alerts to the
edge router component.
Each alert contains threat-specific information such as
device identifier, threat type and time stamp. The edge-
router component receives alerts from all the device-level
components within a LoWPAN and performs a correlation
to evaluate the overall significance of a threat. Within the
current experimentation setup, the threat-specific infor-
mation transmitted through alerts is used to achieve cor-
relation. Furthermore, the frequency of a threat pattern
is used to evaluate the overall impact of a threat which
triggers a mechanism within the edge-router component
to report the alert to a system administrator. Alert corre-
lation is an established research area and we consider more
sophisticated alert correlation experiments an avenue for
future work.
4.2. IoT environment
The proposed IoT system is presented in Fig 2. It
consists of a Border Router (BR) that acts as the DODAG
root for the 6LoWPAN network and connects it to the
Internet through a SLIP interface to a computer. This
computing unit which has higher processing power and
memory than the devices in the 6LoWPAN network, will
be acting as the edge router.
The first tier of nodes that are a part of the 6LoWPAN
are referred to as routers/IDS nodes. These IDS nodes will
be responsible for forwarding packets to and from the edge
router. Additionally, they are responsible for monitoring
the packets passing through them for certain malicious
patterns and report to the edge router by sending periodic
alerts regarding any malicious behavior that may occur
in the network. In order to capture any malicious packet
being sent to the edge router, the IDS nodes are always
placed one hop away from the edge router.
Malicious nodes are located in the second tier. This is
done to make sure they can only join the network through
one of the IDS nodes in the first tier which means that their
packets have to pass through an IDS node before reaching
the edge router. This setting enables us to simulate differ-
ent scenarios to aid evaluation. Figure 2 shows an example
of a network with 5 IDS nodes and 3 malicious nodes. In
order to evaluate the work done in this paper, a set of
simulations have been performed with Cooja using Tmote
Sky motes [3]. Tmote Sky uses a CC2420 IEEE802.15.4
transceiver with 250kbs and has 48kb of flash and 10kb of
RAM. The simulated network was created with one Ede
router, 5 IDS nodes, and 3 malicious nodes. The location
of these malicious nodes was selected at random to make
the simulation more realistic as the location of the mali-
cious node is not known in real life scenarios. Since we aim
to test the impact of the proposed IDS on the devices, we
have started by running some basic experiments in order
to measure a baseline which will be used as a reference for
the comparison with the IDS system. This is done by sim-















Figure 2: Experimental Setup
without the presence of the malicious node, and with the
IDS nodes acting only as RPL routers and exchange only
RPL control messages among themselves and the Edge
router.The Edge router in the baseline experiment only
runs the basic RPL root functionalities.
Another issue that usually rises when dealing with IoT
is the Radio Duty Cycle (RDC). In IoT, the rate of data
transmission is usually low when compared to other net-
works. And so, it is not logical to keep the radio on all
the time when there are no active transmissions in order to
save the power of the nodes. This gave birth to many RDC
protocols that control the rate which nodes can turn on or
off their radios in between transmissions. In Contiki OS,
the prominent RDC protocol is referred to as ContikiMAC.
It takes into consideration the sleep patterns of different
nodes in the network when transmitting or listening. Con-
tiki also features an RDC protocol that keeps the radio on
all the time whether there is active communication or not.
It is called NullRDC. However, when using NullRDC, the
power consumption from the radio is much more than that
of the other factors including the additional computation
from the proposed IDS system. And so, we have only per-
formed test using ContikiMAC in order for the effect of
the IDS system to appear clearly.
We evaluated the performance measurement for two
parameters: the power consumption of the intrusion detec-
tion system, and the memory overhead caused by adding
the IDS features to the device nodes and to the Edge
router. These two metrics are discussed in more detail
in the following subsections.
4.3. Power measurements
As the nodes in an IoT network are usually resource
constrained, any additional feature to be added to them
will have to take into consideration the extra power con-
sumptions it adds to the nodes. Power measurements were
made using the powertrace tool included in Contiki OS
[14]. This tool shows the time each mote spends in one of
four states. Mainly: transmitting (Tx ), receiving (Rx ),
low power mode (LPM), and processing (CPU). Using
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these values, the energy (E) of a node can be calculated
using the following formula
E (mWs) = V ∗(Tx∗19.5+Rx∗21.8+LPM ∗0.0545+CPU ∗1.8)
(1)
The total current is calculated by multiplying the time
spent in each state by the current consumed during such
a state and adding for all the four states. The energy is
then calculated by multiplying the total current with the
nominal voltage V which is 3 volts in the case of Tmote
Sky. The values for each current consumption per state
are taken from the Tmote Sky data sheet and they are
shown in Table 1.
Table 1: Base measurement units for Tmote-Sky nodes.
Typical Operating Conditions MIN NOM MAX UNIT
Supply voltage 2.1 3.6 V
Supply voltage during flash memory programming 2.7 3.6 V
Current Consumption: MCU on, Radio RX 21.8 23 mA
Current Consumption: MCU on, Radio TX 19.5 21 mA
Current Consumption: MCU on, Radio off 1800 2400 µA
Current Consumption: MCU idle, Radio off 54.5 1200 µA
Current Consumption: MCU standby 5.1 21.0 µA
The average power consumption of a single node can be





Which takes into consideration the real time each node
was active.
4.4. RAM and ROM usage
Another scarce resource in IoT is the memory of the
nodes. As these nodes are cheap, small, and usually ex-
pendable, they usually do not have memory size akin to
personal computers. For example, the Tmote Sky has only
48kb of flash and 10kb of RAM. Therefore, we have to mea-
sure the footprint of the code for the baseline setup and
for the IDS setup to assess the extra resources required for
our proposed system. Results for the baseline power and
energy consumptions are presented in the next section.
5. Evaluation
The simulations were performed using the network topol-
ogy shown in the previous section.Figure 3 shows the topol-
ogy of our experimental setup.
The network consists of an edge router (node 1), 5 IDS
nodes (nodes 2-6), and three malicious nodes (nodes 7-9).
In each simulation run, malicious nodes continuously send
malicious packets to the edge router. Different values of
the transmission rate were tested, mainly 1, 10, 100, and
Figure 3: Simulation Topology in COOJA
1000 packets per second. Additionally, malicious nodes al-
ternate between sending one of two predefined malicious
patterns simulating attack signatures. The IDS nodes scan
the payload of all packets passing through them for mali-
cious patterns, and if found, the IDS node collects informa-
tion on that packet such as the source and destination IP
addresses and port numbers of the malicious packet as well
as the attack signature. The IDS nodes will aggregate this
information into an alert packet and send it to the edge
router for further processing simulating anomaly detection
and alert correlation. Two variations on the performance
of the IDS node were tested: when IDS nodes send an alert
to the edge router each time they receive 5 malicious pack-
ets with a certain pattern from a malicious node which we
will refer to as (IDS mode 5). Or when the number of re-
ceived malicious packets is 10 (IDS mode 10). The power
consumption and memory foot print of the IDS framework
for the IDS nodes is measured.
The experimentation presented here specifically tar-
gets performance evaluation of the edge router component
(Global Detection Enactor) of the proposed intrusion de-
tection system. In the simulation, the GDE receives alerts
from the IDS nodes. It then collects certain information
from these alerts, mainly the number of alerts, their source,
and time of occurrence. Based on these information, it at-
tempts to identify correlation between these alerts in order
to decide the course of action for a malicious node. For
instance, depending upon the strength of correlation and
the confidence value produced by the correlation agent, a
malicious node can be suspended from the network. We
have also looked at the power consumption and the mem-
ory overhead of the edge router. However, since the edge
router is always connected to a consistent power supply,
power consumption is not envisaged to be of notable con-
cern. Therefore, in order to demonstrate the effect of the
IDS system on the power consumption of the edge router,
we only show the power consumption that comes from the
additional CPU active time of the edge router.
Specifically, figure 4 shows the power consumption of
the IDS node for the various scenarios simulated. The con-
sumed power was measured after 5, 10, 15 and 20 minutes
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of run time. As illustrated by this figure, the power con-
sumption for different modes of intrusion detection gen-
erally decreases as the size of the IDS alert increases pri-
marily due to the small size of the packets. However, the
difference observed is not deemed significant that may af-
fect the performance of the system greatly.
Additionally, as we are varying the transmission rate of
the malicious node, the simulation time may not be best
option to use as. Therefore, we have measured the power
consumption of the nodes vs the number of malicious pack-
ets received. The results for these experiments are shown
in Figure 5 for 10, 100, and 1000 received malicious pack-
ets. They show a similar trend to those results vs time
where the difference between the consumption is minimal
between the two IDS mode tested.
Figure 6 shows the power consumed by the CPU of the
edge router for different values of the transmission rate of
the malicious node. From Figure 6, it can be observed
that the CPU power consumption of the edge router does
not change much between the two different IDS modes
regardless of the transmission rate. Similar to the IDS
node level, Figure 7 show the CPU power consumption vs
the number of received alerts from the IDS nodes. It is
clear that the consumption due to the extra computation
does not change greatly with the IDS mode change.
Additionally, the Memory footprint of the code has
been measured for both the baseline setup and the IDS
setup. Table 2 presents the memory overhead caused by
adding the IDS functionality to the IDS nodes and the
edge router. From the table, we can conclude that the
ROM overhead does not change as the size of the IDS alert
change. This is because the program itself does not rely on
that size. However, the RAM requirements increase with
the IDS packet size as more information will be saved in
the memory to be sent at once.
Table 2: Memory Overhead caused by the IDS functionality to the
IDS node and the Edge router
IDS Mode RAM overhead ROM overhead
IDS Node 5 368 274
10 728 274
Edge Router 5 198 206
10 378 206
6. Discussion
There are three ways an IDS system can be imple-
mented within an IoT system: as a device-based system,
as an edge router-based system, or as a distributed system.
Additionally, an IDS system can operate either as a stan-
dalone system or as a collaborative system. Existing IDSs
for IoT mostly operate in the standalone setting, i.e. using
data from a single source (edge router or sensor device).
However, standalone systems cannot detect sophisticated
attacks such as stealthy attacks or distributed denial of ser-
vice attacks. On the other hand, distributed collaborative
systems are the more suitable way to implement the IDS
system for the energy constrained IoT devices. In a col-
laborative system, the IDS nodes monitor traffic patterns
or system events and report to other IDS nodes in a dis-
tributed system settings. This paper extends our attempt
presented in [8] towards the design of a collaborative intru-
sion detection system for IoT networks without incurring
high power consumption or memory overhead. The dis-
tributed collaboration between the IDS nodes and the edge
router has the following benefits: 1) it shifts the compu-
tation load from the resource and energy-constrained IoT
devices to the resource rich edge router thus increase life
time of network, and 2) collaboration minimizes the detec-
tion time while correlating information from the different
devices in the network.
The approach presented in this paper segregates intru-
sion detection task among the IoT devices and the edge
router. IoT devices acting as IDS nodes scan any packet
passing through them to decide if they are malicious or
legitimate and send periodic alerts to the edge router re-
garding malicious activity. This enables the Edge router a
comprehensive view of the network allowing it to identify
intruders. The design choice increases processing load at
edge router, but this is not envisaged to create bottleneck
as the edge router is equipped with more resources in terms
of memory and computation power than the other IoT de-
vices in the network. The major limitation of our design
is that it does not ensure the privacy of the host node as
it forwards the raw packets to the edge router which may
contain sensitive information of host nodes. This becomes
a significant challenge when host devices collaborate with
devices belonging to other networks. However, in our de-
sign choice, we assume that the edge router and devices
are placed within the same organization or home. The pri-
vacy of host device in cross-network collaboration can be
protected in two ways: using the cryptographic measures
[9, 10] and secondly exchanging the security model rather
than the raw data.
In this paper, we provided a framework for the collab-
orative intrusion detection in the the resource-constrained
devices. We have used formal notations to present a de-
scription of the system and to evaluate its accuracy with
respect to intrusion detection. The formal notation pro-
vides a template for the system whilst enabling flexibil-
ity in achieving a custom implementation. However, the
framework can be easily extended to apply the machine
learning and deep neural networks [36, 12] to identify ma-
licious traffic patterns. To this extent the deep neural net-
works can be applied in two ways: firstly by deploying the
neural network model at the device level and secondly by
deploying the model at the edge router. The former would
have some overheads, and the latter is not only suitable
in terms of overheads but could have high detection accu-
racy and classification. Furthermore, the advanced learn-
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Figure 7: CPU Power Consumption of the Edge router vs the Number of received alerts
agent of the COLIDE model to enhance the accuracy of
the correlation task which directly affects the effectiveness
of the overall intrusion detection process.
7. Conclusion
The performance efficiency of security measures such
as intrusion detection is paramount for Industrial IoT in-
frastructures primarily due to the resource constraints of
the devices participating in such infrastructures. This pa-
per has presented a novel framework for intrusion detec-
tion which combines host and network based approaches
to achieve efficient intrusion detection for IoT. The pro-
posed system adopts a collaborative approach to address
the intrusion detection challenge whilst minimising the
performance overhead to conserve resources available at
the IoT devices. We have implemented and evaluated the
performance of proposed system by simulating different
network scenarios using Contiki operating system. Our
results show that the proposed approach minimizes the
overall overhead in terms of energy consumption and mem-
ory, and is effective within constrained devices such as the
IoT. As part of the future work, we envisage expanding
evaluation to assess effectiveness of machine learning ap-
10
proaches to enhance performance with respect to accuracy
of detecting large scale complex attacks.
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